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Critics frequently describe Pollock’s allover painted fields, especially those he 
began producing after 1947, as absorbing or engulfing the viewer, occasioning a sensation 
of being immersed within an all- encompassing visual environment. His paintings are said 
to establish so powerful a continuity between viewer and painting that the distinction 
between them collapses, generating a feeling of what the psychologist Anton Ehrenzweig 
notoriously described as “undifferentiated oceanic envelopment.”1 Pollock’s works, he 
continued, “enveloped the spectator inside the picture plane,” producing a “manic expe-
rience of mystic oneness.”2 In them, “pictorial space advances and engulfs [the viewer] in 
a multi- dimensional unity where inside and outside merge.”3 On this account, Pollock’s 
art is immediate, commanding an irresistible connection or mysterious identification.
To express Ehrenzweig’s view in other terms, we might say that Pollock’s works 
radically subverted certain conventions — particularly those associated with mimetic 
easel painting — that traditionally had mediated the relationship between a viewer and 
a painting and that had established their separateness. While it is true that conventions 
of illusionism had facilitated the spectator’s imaginative access to the fictional world of 
the work of art, they also served to make conspicuous a distinction between the actual 
or empirical viewer and the beholder anticipated or projected by the painting. Certainly, 
conventional techniques of illusionism, spatial composition, narrative arrangement, 
and the perspectival positioning of the onlooker were the primary means by which easel 
painters connected the space of the beholder to the space of the painting. But when suc-
cessful, the sheer veracity of the illusioned scene — not only pictorially delimited but 
also literally framed as it was — confirmed for the viewer, in a kind of dialectical reversal, 
the absolute distinction between her own actual standpoint in reality and her imagined 
place in the depiction. This moment of critical alertness inevitably called to mind a fur-
ther distinction between the physical properties of the material object and its pictorial 
content. Acknowledging the conventions as well as the technical strategies by which the 
artist guided her connection to the illusioned scene, the beholder could not help but be 
made aware of the difference between the picture as a literally constructed object and the 
fictional order established by the work of art that held her attention.4
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Insofar as Ehrenzweig sees Pollock’s works as eschewing such conventions in 
order, first, to obliterate the divide between the viewer and the painting, and second, to 
intensify the viewer’s affective experience of oneness, his position rejects the distinction 
to which I have just alluded as well as the principle of art’s mediated or representational 
status. Since the union of painting and viewer constitutes an identification of subject 
and object, we would be authorized to conclude, even, that to Ehrenzweig, whatever the 
viewer feels simply is the painting’s meaning. While that ontological overlap might sound 
appealing because it seems to transcend dualism, Ehrenzweig effectively conflates mean-
ing with experience.5
Ehrenzweig’s notion of Pollock’s antirepresentational immediacy has significant 
traction within both scholarly and popular accounts of Pollock’s art. The assertion that 
his paintings expand beyond their frames is a ubiquitous cliché, the provenance of which 
can be traced to (among others) the artist Allan Kaprow, who famously rejected the idea 
that Pollock’s works were “complete” or bounded.6 “His art gives one the impression,” 
Kaprow claims,
of going on forever . . . the confines of the rectangular field were ignored in lieu of 
an experience of a continuum going in all directions simultaneously, beyond the 
literal dimensions of any work . . . . The four sides of the painting are an abrupt 
leaving- off of the activity which our imaginations continue outward indefinitely, 
as though refusing to accept the artificiality of an “ending.”7
Consequently, Pollock’s canvases “ceased to become paintings and became environments” 
that “sucked in” the audience (the rhetorical parallel with Ehrenzweig’s later assessment 
is striking). Kaprow continues: “[T]he entire painting comes out at the participant (I shall 
call him that, rather than the observer) right into the room.”8 It is significant that Kaprow 
substitutes the traditional designation “observer” with the term “participant.” In doing so, 
he critiques the notion of a detached, ideal point of view from which a spectator passively 
consumes a work of visual art and posits instead an individual who is actively engaged with 
the work, as if responsible for collaboratively producing its meaning through his or her 
experiential participation.9 The lesson for younger artists, Kaprow concluded, was that 
they reject the observational viewpoint and “become preoccupied with and even dazzled 
by the space and objects of our everyday life, either our bodies, clothes, rooms, or, if need 
be, the vastness of Forty- Second Street.”10 The immersion of the viewer- as- participant 
into Pollock’s paintings, reconceived as literal environments, constitutes their mean-
ing — or so Kaprow suggests. Moreover, the critic seems to understand that moment of 
active reception to be just like the way we find meaning in our everyday experiences — that 
is, idiosyncratically, simply by encountering and experi encing things in our physical envi-
ronment. Given Kaprow’s premise of the viewer as being a coproducer of meaning, it 
becomes likely that he, like Ehrenzweig, must see  Pollock’s work as an example of over-
coming representation and mediation. Here, the “vastness” of Forty- Second Street meets 
the “oceanic” drift of Pollock’s immersive spaces to become the flip side of the same coin. 
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In their views, the identity of the work of art, and the artist’s meaning that it is intended to 
express, is superseded by the affective and actual experiences of empirical viewers.
I will soon explain the consequences of the antirepresentational position as 
staked out by Ehrenzweig and Kaprow, but first, a small caveat is called for. It would be 
dogmatic simply to insist that “experience” has nothing to do with meaning, since our 
encounters with works of art begin and end in experience. However, there is more than 
just a heuristic value in distinguishing between what I have been calling actual experi-
ence from pictorial meaning. Arguably, the aspects of our experience having the most 
to do with our attempts to understand the kinds of abstract paintings Pollock and his 
contemporaries produced are those that are felt by viewers to exist in a critical relation 
to the range of pictorial effects, intended by the artist, that we are meant to perceive. To 
the degree that we acknowledge certain pictorial effects as intentionally produced by 
the artist, we impose upon ourselves a challenge to maintain a sense of his or her expres-
sive means in contradistinction to what we contingently happen to feel or think within our 
actual experience.11
The distinction is crucial. In what is to my mind the strongest argument to distin-
guish pictorial meaning from actual or literal experience, Michael Fried in 1967 drew out 
the consequences of conflating the two. Considering the artist Tony Smith’s testimony 
of his nighttime drive along the unfinished New Jersey Turnpike — in which Smith had 
declared the reality of the unframed situation to signal the end of art — Fried pointed out 
that what the sculptor relinquished in favor of his actual experience was the conventional 
nature of art. In other words, Smith’s declaration that “there [was] no way you [could] 
frame [the situation], you just [had] to experience it” entailed a radical “inclusiveness” 
that undermined the value of an artist’s delimitation of his work. For Fried, the abandon-
ment of the frame extinguished the possibility not simply of interpretation (because you 
do not need to interpret what you “just experience”) but also of meaning as such. “Every-
thing [Smith] observes,” Fried remarked, “counts as part of [his] situation and hence is 
felt to bear in some way that remains undefined on his experience.”12 Since there is no 
limit to the range of details Smith, or anyone else, might observe about any situation in 
which he finds himself, there is no way to discern conceptually what is or is not part of the 
(now utterly displaced) “work,” no way to say what should or should not count as part of 
the work’s meaning. There is thus no basis upon which to advance an interpretation of it 
(since we do not know what “it” is).13 In such a scenario, what is rendered irrelevant is the 
artist’s intention: that is, his whole cognitive, embodied, and psychophysiological bearing 
that enables him to answer — in the form of rejecting, accepting, or transforming — the 
historical conventions that serve as the tacit background against which he attempts to 
express his meaning and communicate it to an audience.
What is at stake in the opposition I have been developing is the concept of art’s 
autonomy. On the one hand, I have suggested that “experience,” as the term has often 
been employed with regard to Pollock (couched as “immediacy,” “oneness,” the “oce-
anic,” or the “environmental”), is practically aligned with the empirical viewer, with 
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contingency, context, and affect. On the other hand, I have proposed that meaning as such 
is correlated with intention, expression, interpretation, and understanding. Moreover, I 
have asserted that the delimitation of the work of art by the artist is the condition for any 
account we might give about its meaning, simply because in order to make a claim about 
meaning — in order to interpret a work of art — we must say what we think is or is not part 
of the work, and the only way to do so is to make a case about what we think the artist 
intended the work, and its effects, to be.14 (It bears pointing out that our verdict on what 
the work is — and on what its intended effects are supposed to be — is the basis on which 
we judge whether the work succeeds or fails to realize the artist’s meaning.) Of course, in 
a critical landscape dominated by the assertion that readers and viewers not only partici-
pate in but also actively produce the meaning of the texts and artworks they encounter, 
criticism sympathetic to modernist claims about meaning must articulate a definition of 
autonomy that clarifies its theoretical significance. For the present argument, autonomy 
refers not in a narrow way to the artwork’s putative independence or detachment from the 
sociopolitical world, nor to its strict confinement to a set of technical or formal problems 
of the medium (a position often associated, rather reductively, with Clement Greenberg). 
Instead, I invoke a broader notion of autonomy as the independence of the artist’s mean-
ing from the viewer’s experience.15 This preliminary definition of autonomy requires our 
taking a critical attitude toward the “oneness” that Pollock’s critics (and even he him-
self ) claimed was the end of his art. After reviewing Greenberg’s critical assessment of 
 Pollock’s achievement of autonomy with regard to the artistic conventions of easel paint-
ing within which he worked, I will make a case for how I think Pollock responded formally 
to the challenge of establishing the pictorial identity (the autonomy) of Mural.
Conventions in Crisis
In order to explain the dramatic increase in the size of his paintings after 1948, Pol-
lock scholars sometimes cite a remark the artist made the year before, in an application 
for a Guggenheim Fellowship, where he declared the easel picture to be a “dying form.”16 
While Pollock admitted that he did not yet find the time right for a “full transition from 
easel to mural,” he aimed nonetheless to create pictures that would “constitute a half-
way state,” and he pointed to Mural as providing a precedent for the possibilities of this 
new genre. At 160 square feet, it was the largest painting, by area, that Pollock would ever 
make. And it is one of only two works that he ever made for a specific architectural set-
ting, in this case the entrance hall of Peggy Guggenheim’s town house.17 In other words, 
if Mural is indeed a mural, it is nonetheless anomalous in Pollock’s body of work. Despite 
its title, I am skeptical of the categorical designation, whether it is taken literally (to mean 
that Pollock’s painting is designed only for a specific wall) or metaphorically (to suggest 
that we should consider the image itself as a wall). It is important, I think, not to underes-
timate Pollock’s idea of Mural as still deeply responsive to the conventions of modernist 
easel painting that the artist, throughout the 1930s, had struggled to master. As a painting, 
Mural achieved a certain autonomy from its architectural destination. And understanding 
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its meaning hangs on properly acknowledging how it formally establishes its indepen-
dence both from its context and from the contingent experiences of its viewers.
Pollock’s remark in his 1947 Guggenheim application registers Greenberg’s strong 
influence, as does the artist’s contemporaneous statement for Possibilities magazine 
(Winter 1947–48), in which he declared emphatically that his painting “[did] not come 
from the easel.”18 Earlier in 1947, Greenberg had written that Pollock “point[ed] a way 
beyond the easel . . . to the mural, perhaps.”19 The critic had been working on a longer 
analysis of the problem, which was eventually published in April 1948.20 In “The Crisis 
of the Easel Picture,” he explained that historically, easel painting had been conditioned 
by its social function: to hang on a wall and to provide the viewer with an illusionistic 
scene set within a boxlike cavity. The stability of the genre had allowed artists to develop 
strong principles of internal unity that isolated their pictures, and their pictures’ dra-
matic effects, from the contexts (usually domestic interiors) within which they were 
viewed. In fact, that boxlike space had been key to establishing both the easel form’s inde-
pendence from its architectural setting and its difference from the merely decorative. 
The meaning and validity of the artist’s expression, Greenberg seems to have thought, 
rested on establishing these dual distinctions. At the same time, and since the viewer 
himself was part of the easel painting’s actual setting, the autonomy Greenberg ascribed 
to the easel picture had to derive from a structure of beholding that managed to seal the 
representation against a viewer’s empirical standpoint. What mattered was not where 
the viewer actually stood, but the point of view that the artist constructed, the vantage 
point projected by the painting. (In traditional one- point perspective, this is determined 
by the vanishing point’s relative distance from and angle to the picture plane, which cor-
responds to the notional distance and angle from which the viewer imagines surveying 
the scene.) Thus the “crisis,” in Greenberg’s analysis, manifestly concerned the issue of 
the easel form’s constructed point of view.
Modern artists, Greenberg observed, had undermined the conventions of 
illusionistic space and the traditional laws of composition that had guaranteed the 
self- sufficiency of the easel picture. From Manet through the cubists, modernists had 
contracted the boxlike cavity, radically narrowing the illusionistic corridor that notion-
ally occupies the far side of the picture plane. At the same time, certain “all- over” 
techniques (such as the consistent weave of brushstrokes used by the impressionists, 
or the dispersed, faceted planes favored by cubists) tended to “reduce the picture to an 
undifferentiated surface.”21 Those effects brought such paintings to the brink of decora-
tion, as if they were “wallpaper patterns capable of being extended indefinitely.”22 And 
the problem was getting worse. Recent allover paintings by Pollock and his peers threat-
ened to dissolve into a “hallucinated uniformity.”23 The “dissolution of the picture into 
sheer texture,” Greenberg wrote in his 1961 revision of the essay, had “infect[ed] the 
whole notion of the genre [of easel painting] with a fatal ambiguity.”24
That pronouncement of a crisis in painting’s traditional conventions was fueled 
by a dire sociological observation. “The Crisis of the Easel Picture” happened to be the 
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last in a series of three important articles from late 1947 and early 1948 in which the critic 
addressed the diminishing capacity of modern art to address critically the social and cul-
tural situation from which it emerged.25 In the first essay of the trio, “The Present Pros-
pects of American Painting and Culture” (October 1947), Greenberg wrote that modern 
industrialization since the mid- nineteenth century had resulted in a pervasive “leveling 
out and rationalization of culture.”26 Although the condition itself was nothing new, 
he found its intensity in the United States exceptionally acute in the 1940s, even as a 
postwar boom in which consumerism was on the rise had begun to replace the economy 
of scarcity characteristic of wartime America. Instead of being buoyed by the change, 
Greenberg expressed the near total “flattening and emptying” of American life.27 Attend-
ing to the ways modern European artists (specifically the impressionists) had responded 
historically to the acceleration of industrial development and mechanization, and to the 
social changes those processes entailed, the critic theorized that they had recognized 
that modern life could only be “dealt with in material terms.”28 So, he suggested, the 
tightly covered, meshed surfaces of impressionism registered “naked sensations” that 
were independent of any metaphysical significance, yielding images that were analogous 
to modernity’s positivist mentality.29 In a kind of homeopathic gesture, late nineteenth- 
century French artists, experiencing the effects of modernization, openly acknowledged 
and then absorbed society’s materialist premises, as if to inoculate their art against 
its disease. Impressionist techniques thereby protected the easel genre from modern 
empiri cism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism — a process that enabled it to represent 
modernity all the more comprehensively.30
Greenberg pointed out that contemporary artists, by contrast, were turning a 
blind eye to modern positivism, avoiding its reality by indulging in escapist fantasies. 
American painters had “difficulty in acknowledging and stating the dull horror” of their 
existence.31 Consequently, they were driven to ever more evasive and extreme affective 
positions: “We [in the United States],” he explains, “confronted more immediately by 
the paraphernalia of industrialism, see the situation as too overwhelming to come to 
terms with, and look for an escape in transcendent exceptions and aberrated states.”32 
That quasi- romantic avoidance, he thought, caused artists to fall back on clichés, and 
prevented the realization of an art that could “answer contemporary life, [and] found our 
sensibilities.”33 To Greenberg’s eyes in 1948, finding art that confronted the problems of 
the historical period without attempting to escape them in “spasmodic” feeling seemed 
a nearly impossible task.34 The second essay of the trio, “The Situation at the Moment” 
(January 1948), intensifies his rhetoric. “Mercilessness and pessimism,” the reader is told, 
are required to “confront the situation as it is.”35 He continued: “Isolation, or rather the 
alienation that is its cause, is the truth — isolation, alienation, naked and revealed unto 
itself, is the condition under which the true reality of our age is experienced. And the 
experience of this true reality is indispensible to any ambitious art.”36
At this point, Greenberg’s argument takes an unexpected turn. He says that rep-
resenting the condition — creating art out of it — requires the abandonment of easel 
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painting in favor of something like the mural (but, as we will see, not exactly like it). Why? 
He proposes a dialectical answer. At the very moment the abstract artist finds himself suf-
fering his isolation in private — and at the same time as the difficulties and demands of his 
art become ever less appreciated by the public — he is motivated to enlarge his painting 
in order to give his assessment of the historical situation public form. Greenberg never 
explains exactly what fuels that motivation, admitting only that it is “as persistent [an 
urge] as it is largely unconscious.”37 The amplified pictures the critic projects as resulting 
“would spread over [the wall] and acknowledge its physical reality” without “becoming 
identified with the wall like a mural.”38 Ironically, the painter’s anticipation of an archi-
tectural destination — and thus of a social location — for the reception of his art contrasts 
strikingly with the private, albeit existentially isolated, conditions of its creation. Perhaps 
we can understand that contradiction as what makes the genre contemplated by Green-
berg (and Pollock) as one that is “halfway” between the easel and mural.
That irresolvable contradiction between painting and its architectural destina-
tion — between the alienated conditions under which individuals produced paintings 
as expressions of their private selves and the distant public toward which they almost 
hopelessly reached — specifically defines the crisis Greenberg describes in the last of his 
three essays, “The Crisis of the Easel Picture,” with which I began this discussion. If the 
conventions of easel painting could no longer sufficiently guarantee the artist’s expres-
sion and the autonomy of the work of art, new means of securing its independence were 
necessary. Greenberg discovered them in Pollock. The strength of his paintings, the critic 
argued, was in the “emphatic surfaces of his pictures, which it is his concern to inten-
sify in all that thick, fuliginous flatness.”39 Pollock’s work, despite its admittedly gothic 
paranoia and resentment (qualities Greenberg dismissed), was “an attempt to cope with 
urban life” by concerning itself with “immediate sensations.”40 It was “positivist [and] 
concrete.”41 The allover paintings by Pollock and others were “knit together of a mul-
tiplicity of identical or similar elements, repeat[ed] . . . without strong variation from 
one end of the canvas to the other and [had] dispense[d], apparently, with beginning, 
middle and ending.”42 Greenberg did not know quite what to make of the phenomenon 
of so thoroughly atomized picture surfaces. On one side, he seems to have welcomed the 
destruction of easel painting at the hands of advanced artists, because it necessitated 
the creation or establishment of new norms and conventions that could serve “as the 
vehicle of ambitious art.”43 On the other side, he worried that the seemingly undiffer-
entiated picture surfaces of allover paintings — what he described as their hallucinated 
uniformity — would compromise the work of art’s ability to achieve a self- sufficiency and 
independence analogous to the older form.44
Autonomy and Pictorial Content
Greenberg’s analysis prompts us to reconsider a commonly held but narrow 
view of autonomy. Later commentators have unfairly accused the critic of uphold-
ing the clearly untenable view that art is separate from life, detached from the world, 
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removed from or independent of its historical context. Against this reductive cliché, 
autonomy — on Greenberg’s account — is attained only within and in relation to a set of 
historical conventions. For him, autonomy is dialectical, its status determined — or bet-
ter, instituted — by an artist who acknowledges the conventions of his medium as limit-
ing factors that are the very condition of pictorial expression.45 And the critic’s remarks 
furthermore direct us to the problem of achieving autonomy during a historical period 
in which traditional — and even modernist — conditions of painting’s self- sufficiency were 
under extreme pressure. Insofar as Pollock, in 1947, voiced his desire to move beyond 
easel painting, we might take his views to have been in concert with those of the critic. 
For him, too, the act of abandoning the easel form was fraught as much with danger as 
with possibility.
That ambivalence echoes, perhaps, in the apocryphal stories of Pollock’s anxi-
ety before the eight- by- twenty- foot stretch of canvas that would become Mural. If, as it 
seems likely, he felt the weight of his task, I am tempted to speculate that it was not, or not 
merely, produced by his apprehension about how or what to paint on such a large scale, 
nor about finishing it on time, nor about pleasing his rich patroness. It would also have 
been the result of implicitly facing the problem of securing Mural’s independence as a 
painting against its architectural destination (and against charges of decoration). There 
is evidence that Pollock worried about establishing the pictorial identity of each painting 
he produced. Lee Krasner recounted that her husband — who sometimes questioned her 
about where to crop a canvas, or how a picture should be oriented — once simply asked 
her: “Is this a painting?”46 If the need to verify his successful creation of a painting indi-
cates a chronic preoccupation with achieving expression within a convention (for how 
else would he know that he had, indeed, made a painting, instead of just covered a surface 
with paint?), then understanding the basis of that concern is fundamental to understand-
ing his art.
Following Greenberg, I suggest that Pollock’s challenge in Mural was to establish 
for his large- scale work an autonomy analogous to that traditionally associated with 
easel painting.47 Consider, as just one instance of this effort, a work Pollock produced 
for his 1943 show at Art of This Century, in which autonomy is made into a kind of theme 
of the imagery. Stenographic Figure (ca. 1942), also on view a bit earlier for Guggenheim’s 
Spring Salon for Young Artists, announces the theme. Pollock depicts a single reclining 
nude whose sex is marked by a triangle wedged between splayed legs. But given what 
Kirk Varnedoe called the “willed confusions” of this painting, it is possible to see the 
composition, as many scholars have, as containing two figures who gesture to each other 
across a table.48 On the canvas surface floats a plethora of calligraphic symbols, rudimen-
tary signs, numbers, and seemingly errant marks. The area between the figures is not so 
much defined as a spatial volume as it is simply partitioned by the flat shapes it contains. 
Pollock’s division of the surface into distinct planar sections, that is, creates numerous 
independent zones, despite the allover scattering of marks that helps establish for the 
painting a consistent virtual picture plane, like a scrim hovering between a viewer and the 
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scene. The effect is of a strangely uneven spacing that segregates the protagonists despite 
the frantic gesticulations they make to each other within their disjointed world.
Stenographic Figure establishes an analogy between the meaning of those ges-
tures — or better, the possibility that they might mean — and the possible meaning of the 
painting itself for a viewer. But that meaning is not a matter of deciphering Pollock’s 
coded stenography or of reading his strange script. Rather, it has to do with the paint-
ing’s theme of separateness as the condition of communication. At least, this is how I 
interpret Pollock’s technical choice to render the space so resolutely partitioned and 
disjointed — as if to recapitulate formally, and to pictorially express, the condition that 
keeps the figures apart. Perhaps we are also meant to acknowledge the painting’s pictorial 
identity, just as we must acknowledge the identity of another, as the source of our capac-
ity to join in a communicative act.
Mural and Meaning
In Stenographic Figure, our grasp of Pollock’s allegory of communication depends 
on our identifying what is happening in the scene: two figures gesture to each other across 
a divide. That allegory applies not just to the figures depicted in the fictional narrative 
but also extends to the beholder outside the picture, who faces the painting and tries 
to interpret it. In Mural, or so I shall argue, the painter- beholder relationship as an alle-
gory of (possible) expression, communication, interpretation, and understanding is 
motivated and sustained by the painting’s abstract pictorial effects (see pl. 1).49 Pollock 
seems to have recognized that the conventions or norms that might guarantee painting’s 
autonomy after the desolation of easel painting could be generated out of the specific 
spatial and perceptual characteristics he created in his painted fields, not just by his nar-
rative imagery.
Mural renders pictorial dimension so insistently flat over such a large surface area 
that it compromises imaginative projections into depth. In fact, I am tempted to say that 
the effect of a flattened but still salient depth creates an impression of what Michael Fried 
has called in another context “facingness,” a quality of instantaneous strikingness that 
produces a powerful sense of the painting’s formal and expressive closure. Such an inten-
sified mode of frontal address, Fried explains, served historically to build into a painting 
“the separateness, distancedness, and mutual facing that had always characterized the 
painting- beholder relationship.”50
That effect results in part from the complex lateral flow of pictorial energy in 
Mural between, but not quite around, the predominant, quasi- vertical black lines and 
arcs. Although those lines do not exactly enclose figural profiles, it would be willful to 
deny that their structural role is not in some way analogous to a bodily, or perhaps skele-
tal, propping up of the picture as a manifestly vertical plane.51 I am, however, interested 
less in seeing the circular forms along the top edge as representing the “heads” of march-
ing stick figures than I am in describing their role in creating Mural’s complex dimen-
sionality. There is a difference between the type of space those loops contain and the 
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type — or, I am tempted to say, the modality — of space elsewhere in the painted field. In 
their catalog essay, the Getty conservators discuss Pollock’s use of “light background 
‘reserves,’” the appearance of a primed but otherwise unpainted ground in various places 
across the surface.52 I am drawn to the word “reserve.” The term connotes a kind of hold-
ing back. Consider the looped canvas reserves as demarcating spaces Pollock meant to 
dissociate from others he created (fig. 1). The areas lassoed by the coils of black, slate gray, 
and salmon pink along the top framing edge are pointedly empty: they are flat in the sense 
that their flatness is felt to be a physical characteristic of the material surface we are, after 
all, looking at. But there is another kind of “flatness” Mural alludes to. Pollock calls our 
attention to the literally flat in order to distinguish it from the pictorially flat. In various 
zones just below the reserves of actual canvas, Pollock offers us that pictorial alternative. 
Between the more linear elements, he used an off- white trade paint to fill in viscid and 
Fig. 1. Detail of Mural (1943) by Jackson Pollock (American, 1912–56), showing canvas reserves 
along the top framing edge and painted “reserves” nearby.
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almost gummy passages; we might think of them as painted “reserves.” The surround-
ing lariats and swirls seem to fasten into them, binding the field and its “ground” to re- 
create the painting’s flatness by preserving the modality of space “behind” the painting’s 
field.53 I see Pollock’s final layering of the painted reserves as compromising their role as 
the putative ground against which the linear figures appear in shallow relief. Those light 
areas suddenly assert themselves, projecting what might otherwise be sensed as a ground 
plane, or even as indeterminate depth behind the figure, toward the viewer.
Within that field, there is a global distribution of concentrated pictorial energies, 
a ubiquitous exchange of intensities, that modulates the surface. Three key technical 
choices heighten the effect. First, the initial paint gestures were not, as many scholars 
had assumed, the elongated structuring lines, but rather broadly applied patches of red, 
yellow, and dark teal with blue.54 Although that patchwork is obscured by subsequent lay-
ers of paint, the logic of starting the work with a partitioned or zone organization might 
help explain the sense of the field as an aggregate plane, the vitality of which is felt to be 
infused in every mark and to confront the viewer at every point.
Second, Pollock intended the surface to have differential reflective values. The 
1973 conservation effort, which included varnishing the surface, reduced the differences 
between the matte and glossy paints that Pollock originally used.55 Their dissimilar sheen 
would have made (and, subsequent to the 2012–14 conservation effort, do make) passages 
of contrasting luster. Mural’s variable surface reflectivity creates a fluctuating optical 
perception, the pulse of which reinforces the plasticity of the image — an image that is 
seemingly “responsive . . . to one’s own act of looking” (here again, Fried’s description is 
the most apt).56 It is possible that Guggenheim herself noticed and intended to heighten 
this effect when she installed a special high-luminosity lighting system that further inten-
sified the contrasts.57
The effect of a kind of flexible visuality that both connects and counterpoises the 
viewer and the image is reinforced by a third technical decision. Pollock offers a pointed 
contrast between wet- into- wet areas and dry passages. The former appear blurrier than 
those featuring a progressive layering of colors, so that the viewer senses a need to adjust 
her eyes, and perhaps even change position, to enhance her visual acuity. In other words, 
Pollock actively manages, and thus places into a point of view, the viewer he anticipated 
or projected as encountering the work. The viewer’s awareness of Pollock’s intentional 
management of the imaginative position she must occupy to “see” the painting is the 
result of her critical attention to Mural’s intended effects. Those effects, in other words, 
simply are the means by which Pollock fixes the viewer’s standpoint and concomitantly 
establishes the work’s autonomy, its separateness.
There is a further technique by which Pollock accomplishes this task, one that 
returns us to the issue of categorizing the work as essentially an easel painting or as a 
mural (or something “halfway” between the two). Considering that Mural was commis-
sioned for a specific location, a problem immediately presents itself. Given Pollock’s 
admiration for the mural form, the goal of establishing Mural’s identity as a painting 
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might seem not only to violate formative aspects of his training (specifically that which 
he received from Thomas Hart Benton and David Alfaro Siqueiros) but also to contradict 
his personal and political investment in the form of the public mural, where placement 
and site have as much to do with its message as its subject matter does.58 His self- imposed 
demand to fix Mural’s identity as a painting, separate from the space it was destined for, 
would then seem not only paradoxical but perhaps hypocritical — a repudiation of his 
commitment to art’s social role.59 Nonetheless, it is in relation to Siqueiros that one final 
observation may be made about how Mural establishes its autonomy.
Visitors to Guggenheim’s town house entered through a door at a right angle to 
Pollock’s painting, from which they would have looked down the length of the canvas 
from right to left (fig. 2). Pollock knew this, and he would have felt the challenge to cre-
ate an image that would be contained within its frame, despite the lateral acceleration 
of vision across the surface. While it is certainly not the only constraint that determined 
the painting’s compositional structure, note that the while the right half of the painting 
contains three or four predominant verticals, the left half of the painting contains a cas-
cade of three or four long arcs, bowing outward from a central zone that seems marked 
by a prominent blue half- arc anchored to the top framing edge near its midpoint. The full 
sweep of each arc is interrupted by curlicue vortexes of paint. Their sensual shapes, like 
swirling eddies, contrast pointedly with the relatively contained circular forms found 
interspersed among the upright figures. It is possible, of course, that Pollock wanted 
us to understand that juxtaposition of rigidity and enclosure with openness and volup-
tuousness as symbolically repeating the unification of male and female energies that 
was a leitmotif in his work at this moment. Additionally, I see the divided composition 
as creating, for an angled view, a perceptual effect that solicits the beholder to reposition 
himself directly in front of the painted field. From a sidelong view, the compositional 
elements conspire to create the impression of a left- to- right flow of energy — that is, 
against the direction a viewer, under the conditions of Mural’s original setting, initially 
would have moved.60 This sensation of palpable resistance to the lateral directional-
ity of vision is analogous to wading upstream. A resolution to the perceptual tension is 
achieved when the viewer steps back, as if to sidestep the current, to face the painting 
from a perpendicular angle.
If I am right about that effect, the dynamic re- situation of the viewer is not unlike 
that which typically is associated with anamorphosis, the technical construction of a 
perspectival system in which a depiction appears naturalistically — its elements cor-
rectly related in scale and spatial arrangement — from only one particular point of view. 
The viewer, encountering a perceptually distorted image, attempts to discover and 
then occupy the perspectival location from which the anamorphic projection resolves. 
(Perhaps the most famous example of this type of representation in painting is Hans 
 Holbein’s The Ambassadors of 1533.) Of course, anamorphosis was a central technique 
by which Siqueiros stage- directed viewers of his public murals to place themselves at a 
precise point of perspectival resolution. Indeed, coming to occupy that exact point of 
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view allegorized the viewer’s coming to occupy a revolutionary standpoint from which 
a history of ideological and class struggle would become not only visible but forcefully 
present to her consciousness.61
If Mural is any evidence, then Pollock internalized the general idea of anamorphic 
repositioning. His composition asks the viewer to move outward, away from the picture, 
and to see it from a distance. Although the imagery will never “resolve” to produce a 
mimetic image, that repositioning requires the viewer to occupy what is arguably the 
most conventional position from which to perceive a painting — namely, in front of and 
facing it. That primordial convention sustains the distinction between the viewer and 
the work of art that I have been arguing is central to any account of pictorial meaning. At 
Fig. 2. Installation view of Mural (1943) by Jackson Pollock (American, 1912–56), as installed at the 
J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, in 2014, photographed from the approximate angle at which a 
viewer might have seen it on first entering Peggy Guggenheim’s town house.
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least part of the content of Mural has to do with making available, as a pictorial effect, a 
certain proposition: namely, that its separateness is the condition of Pollock’s (possible) 
expression. Its “autonomy,” then, should be understood not in a narrow sense — as the 
isolation of the work of art from the world — but rather as the independence of its mean-
ing — Pollock’s meaning — from our contingent experiences.62
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